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VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES LAW
VIOLATIONS: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND THE
CONTROLLING PERSON SECTIONS
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 regulate a broad range of activities involving securities trans-
actions and impose civil liability for violations of various of their pro-
visions and regulations promulgated thereunder.' Liability extends not
only to those directly responsible for violations but, under section 15
of the Securities Act4 and section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,'
jointly and severally to persons who "control" 6 violators. Each of these
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
2. Id. §5 78a-78hh.
3. For a general discussion of civil liabilities under the securities laws, see 3 L. Loss,
SEcuiu=s REGULATION 1683-1754 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1970) provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise, controls any person liable under section 77k or 771 of, this
title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
5. Id. § 78t(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
6. Neither the Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act specifically defines
"control," "controlling," or "controlled." Indeed, it appears from the legislative his-
tory that the omission of a definition was intentional. With respect to the Securities
Exchange Act, it was stated:
It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term ["control"]. It
would be difficult if. not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many
ways in which control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used
are stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well known that
actual control sometimes may be exerted through ownership of much less
than a majority of the stock of a corporation either by ownership of such
stock alone or through such ownership in combination with other factors.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). Although there is no definition
of control within the statutes, the SEC, in keeping with the suggestion of the House
report, has viewed control in very broad terms. SEC Rule 12b-2, for example, defines
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sections, however, provides a defense for the controlling person: Sec-
tion 15 exempts a controlling person from joint and several liability
if he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist"; 7 section 20(a) exempts a controlling person
who "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 8
Employer liability for certain employee misconduct exists at common
law under the agency principle of respondeat superiorY Unlike the
vicarious liability imposed by sections 15 and 20(a), no "good faith"
or "no knowledge" defense is available where liability is premised upon
respondeat superior, the employer being liable for the conduct of an
employee within the scope of his employment regardless of any per-
sonal culpability on the part of the employer. 10 The distinction between
these two theories of vicarious liability in terms of the availability of a
defense has led to significant questions involving statutory interpre-
tation and the policy of the securities laws. Specifically, where it is
sought to impute liability to a brokerage house for securities law vio-
lations by an employee, the question arises whether the plaintiff may
invoke the absolute liability imposed on an employer by respondeat
superior or must proceed under the controlling person provisions of the
securities acts,1 ' in which case the brokerage house may escape liability
by establishing the appropriate defense.
In SEC v. Lur's, Inc., 2 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the controlling person sections
provide the exclusive basis for imputing liability to the employer for
an employee's violation of the securities laws. It is submitted that this
holding was premised upon an overly broad reading of the precedents
control as "the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of. voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1973).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1970).
8. Id. § 78t(a).
9. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 215-67 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as REsTATEMENT].
10. Id. §§ 219, 229.
11. The courts generally consider the controlling person provisions of the two acts
together, citing authority construing one in support of a similar construction of the
other. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v.
Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md.
1968), aff'd in part, reVd in part, and remanded, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
12. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). '
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cited and a failure to interpret the statutory language in a manner consist-
ent with the remedial purpose of the securities laws. The nature of the
harm these statutes were enacted to prevent suggests that the controlling
person provisions were intended to be supplemental means for extend-
ing vicarious liability to certain situations in which liability could not
be imputed under strict agency theory. The sections thus should not
be construed as exclusive sources of relief, eliminating the investor pro-
tection traditionally available under the principle of respondeat superior.
The action by the Securities and Exchange Commission against the
Lehman Brothers brokerage firm was based on the gratuitous passing
by a firm member to persons holding securities of Lum's, Inc. of insider
information concerning changes in the financial position of that cor-
poration. Although holding the employee liable, the court relieved
Lehman Brothers of liability for violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act 13 and rule lob-514 promulgated thereunder.
Specifically rejecting the argument by the SEC that the brokerage firm
should be liable for its employee's illegal activities under the principle
of respondeat superior, the court concluded that section 20(a) is the
exclusive standard for determining vicarious liability under the Securities
Exchange Act."a Foundation for this position was argued to exist in
the congressional intent in enacting the controlling person sections. In
addition, although conceding that a broker-dealer's primary duty to
the public is to provide adequate and reasonable supervision of its
employees, the court held that the need for such supervision does not
warrant imposition of absolute liability. After observing that "[e]very
violation ... by a salesman does not necessarily imply a breach of the
employer's duty to supervise," "6 the court exonerated Lehman Brothers
from liability as a controlling person under section 20(a) on the basis
of its "good faith" defense that it neither induced its employee to
commit the wrongful acts nor was negligent in failing to supervise him
adequately.
Application of the controlling person sections to the typical employer-
employee relationship is not novel; 7 the Lur's court, however, is the
first to take such a forceful stand on the exclusivity issue. Myzel v.
Fields"8 and SEC 'v. First Securities Co.19 provide the strongest support
13. 15 U.S.C. 5 78j (1970).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
15. 365 F. Supp. at 1062.
16. ld. at 1064.
17. See 36 FoianHA~i L. Rav. 95 (1967).
18. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
19. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
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for the position that the controlling person sections are exclusive means
of imposing vicarious liability for securities law violations. Cited by the
court in Lum's for the proposition that "the respondeat superior stand-
ard does not apply" to securities acts cases, 20 both decisions employed
the controlling person provisions in holding principals liable for their
agents' securities violations. Although there was no discussion in either
case whether vicarious liability under sections 15 and 20(a) is the
exclusive means for imputing liability for an agent's violation of the
securities laws, both courts recognized that a principal would be liable
on agency grounds if his agent's actions constitute common law torts as
well as statutory violations.21 It is thus arguable that the courts con-
sidered agency theory restricted to common law torts and the con-
trolling person sections determinative of a principal's liability for an
agent's statutory violations.
Of the other cases cited by the Lum's court in which liability of a
brokerage firm for the acts of its employees had been predicated on
section 20(a), two invoked the controlling person provision without
discussion of the possibility of liability based on respondeat superior, 2
while another contained dictum that liability under section 20(a) is
"not restricted by principles of agency or conspiracy." 23 Despite its
apparent importance to the Lum's court, the final case cited, Kamen &
Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,24 is not without ambiguity in its appli-
cation to the exclusivity question. In Kamen the plaintiff had con-
tended that the statutory duties imposed on stock exchange members
are nondelegable and that an employer therefore should be liable to
the same extent as an employee committing violations. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that the plaintiff's theories
"may be valid propositions of law but they have no application to actions
20. 365 F. Supp. at 1062.
21. In Myzel the court held that the defendant's liability for his agent's rule 10b-5
violations was governed "neither by principles of agency nor conspiracy" but by section
20 of the Securities Exchange Act. It then observed that "under common law principles,
a principal is liable for the deceit of his agent committed in the very business he was
appointed to carry out." 386 F.2d at 738. The First Securities court, after holding the
defendant corporation liable for its president's common law fraud on agency principles,
in another section of its opinion founded liability for the same acts upon the con-
trolling person provisions as violations of SEC Rule 10b-5. 463 F.2d at 985-87.
22. Douglass v. Glen E. Hinton Invs., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis supplied).
24. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942, cert. dismissed, 393
U.S. 801 (1968), rev'g CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,565 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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maintained under the Securities Acts." 20 The defendant was exonerated
under the controlling person sections on the basis of its good faith and
lack of any reasonable grounds for knowledge of its employees' illegal
conduct.
Although the Lum's court interpreted the holding in Kamen as
implying that respondeat superior has no place in determining vicarious
liability under the securities laws,26 further examination reveals this
view to be questionable. The Kamen court had already exonerated
the defendant of common law agency liability for its employees' fraud-
ulent misrepresentations on the ground that the plaintiff was suffi-
ciently experienced in the securities industry to realize that Kamen's
representatives were not authorized to engage in the particular mis-
conduct with which they were charged. Whether the court would
have followed the same reasoning regarding the controlling person
sections of the statutes if it had not already found an absence of com-
mon law liability on agency doctrines is, at best, conjectural.
Even less precedential value may be accorded Lanza v. Drexel &
Co.,2 in which Kamen was specifically approved by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Lum's court, while recognizing
that Lanza was not directly on point, cited that case as supportive of
its exclusivity position. Not only is Lanza not direcdy on point, but,
it is submitted, approval there of the Kamen decision is irrelevant to
the conclusion reached in Lum's. In Lanza no principal-agent relation-
ship was involved; rather, the issue was one of a director's liability for
the rule 10b-5 violations of corporate officers, and the court approved
the Kamen holding that section 20 is determinative of a controlling
person's liability, as opposed to direct liability under the rule, and not
as opposed to liability under agency principles.2 9
Of primary interest to the Lum's court was a statement in Lanza
which it quoted as follows: "'The intent of Congress in adding this
section [20], passed at the same time as the amendment to section 15
of the 1933 Act, was obviously to impose liability only on those ...
who fall within its definition of control and who are in some meaningful
sense culpable participants in the fraud perpetrated by controlled per-
sons.' "30 It is imperative to note that this quotation was taken out of
25. Id. at 697.
26. 365 F. Supp. at 1062-63.
27. 382 F.2d at 694-96. See 29 MD. L. REv. 59, 65 (1969).
28.479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 1301.
30. 365 F. Supp. at 1064, quoting from 479 F.2d at 1299.
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context: It was presented in relation to a corporate director's liability,
not an employer-employee relationship. Indeed, the convenient
placement of ellipses by the Lum's court eliminated the single word
"directors." a3
The use of the word "agency" in section 15 of the Securities Act32
arguably may indicate that the section was intended to preempt com-
mon law agency doctrine. Moreover, although neither "agency" nor
any other relationship is specified in section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, this lack of specificity appears to have been intentional,
the draftsmen of that section having stated: "In this section . . . when
reference is made to 'control', the term is intended to include actual
control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control." 33
Congress thus apparently left undefined the term "control" in an effort
to encompass the widest possible range of relationships where control of
another exists, including those as yet unimagined schemes that were
certain to be developed in attempts to frustrate the purpose of the Act.34
Following this reasoning, and reading the two statutes in pari materia, it
becomes apparent that section 20(a), as well as section 15 of the Securi-
ties Act, was intended to embrace agency relationships.
Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that existing liabilities were
intended to be disturbed by either statute. Taldng into account the
atmosphere surrounding passage of the securities laws, it is hardly
conceivable that Congress could have intended to narrow liabilities
under common law agency principles while extending liability to per-
sons formerly unreachable at common law. Rather, it is more probable
that the controlling person provisions were enacted to extend lia-
bility into those agency situations where strict application of respondeat
superior principles would preclude liability, that is, where the agency
relationship is not founded upon the employer-employee nexus required
f6r application of respondeat superior. The more limited vicarious
liability under sections 15 and 20(a) would indeed be appropriate
where the controlling person does not have the opportunity for super-
vision that is available, at least theoretically, in the employer-employee
relationship.
31. 479 F.2d at 1299. Moreover, the legislative reports cited by the court in Lzon's
in support of its "ineluctable" conclusion (365 F. Supp. at 1063-64) relate to section 11
of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), and the direct liabilities of directors and
others thereunder, not to liabilities under the controlling person sections. See H.R. REP.
No. 152, 73d Cong, 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
32. See note 4 supra.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) (emphasis supplied).
34. See notes 47-50 infra & accompanying text.
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A second argument against imposition of strict vicarious liability upon
an employer for the securities law violations of its employees similarly
overlooks the remedial purposes of the securities acts. Arguably, the
creation of new statutory causes of action ' with lesser burdens of
proof upon plaintiffsO0 than existed under common law theories imposes
unreasonable responsibilities upon employers held strictly accountable
under the principle of respondeat superior. According to this reasoning,
the defenses available to controlling persons under the securities acts
should be available to employers to compensate for the increased likeli-
hood of plaintiff recovery for employee violations. The character of
the harm the securities statutes were enacted to remedy indicates, how-
ever, an equal or greater likelihood that Congress, in fact, intended to
increase the employer's exposure to liability.
Many, if not a majority, of the frauds perpetrated in the securities
industry involve the misconduct of employees, 7 typically in the form
of false or unfounded representations made to a customer by a sales
representative and frequently without actual knowledge or bad faith on
the part of the firm's management. The average investor, however, is
entitled to, and customarily does, rely on the integrity, reputation, and
responsibility of the brokerage firm itself, rather than the particular
employee with whom he deals. Moreover, it is the firm which reaps
benefits from the transaction, whether financial, as in most cases, or
simply in the potential for future transactions, and it is the firm to whom
the investor should be able to look for compensation. These considera-
tions militate strongly against the suggestion that Congress intended
to condone what, in effect, would be the "hear-no-evil, see-no-evil"
approach to brokerage management38 which would follow from re-
quiring exclusive use of the controlling person sections, with their
concomitant defenses, to impose vicarious liability for employee vio-
lations of securities laws.
35. For example, mere participation in an unregistered sale of stock may be action-
able. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
36. The plaintiff, for example, may be relieved of proving reliance upon the mis-
representations of a brokerage house employee, as well as any causal connection between
his damages and the employee's misconduct. Newberg v. American Dryer Corp., 195
F. Supp. 345, 352 (ED. Pa. 1961).
37. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 23, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co.,
390 U.S. 942 (1968), in Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 606 n.37, 607 n.41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief].
38. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (D. Md. 1968).
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A more reasonable interpretation of the purpose of the controlling
person sections is illustrated by Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,0
in which an employee of the Hutton brokerage firm had made material
misrepresentations to induce the purchase of certain oil production
payments. Finding an agency relationship, the court imposed Securi-
ties Act liability upon the firm for the employee's fraudulent acts under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.40 In reply to the firm's contention
that its liability was that of a "controlling person" subject to the defenses
of section 15, the court characterized the purpose of that provision
to have been a means of imposing liability "which would supplement,
and extend beyond, common law principles of agency and respondeat
superior." 41 Johns Hopkins thus stands for the proposition that the
controlling person sections were intended to apply only where liability
cannot be imposed under other theories.4
Recendy, in Fey v. Walston & Co.,43 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in applying the principle of respondeat superior to
alleged violations by a brokerage house employee of antifraud provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act, stressed that "the 'control' doc-
trine... has not preempted or restricted operation of general rules in
the securities field." 4 Observing that "the recognized policy of public
protection requires the two types of remedy to be complementary,
39. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 1210. The court relied upon section 257 of the RESATEM\ENT OF AGENCY,
supra note 9.
Professor Ruder has observed: "The use of agency principles to support liability
in securities litigation suggests that the semicodified principles of the common law as
set forth in the Restatement of Agency ... are becoming part of the securities law
civil liability framework." Ruder, supra note 37, at 603 (footnote omitted). For other
examples of courts citing the REsTATEmENT oF AGENCY in securities litigation, see
Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 623 (5th Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H.
Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 1967).
41. 297 F. Supp. at 1212.
42. In fact the court's language assigns more than a primary role to respondeat
superior: "[Tlhis Court ...does not believe that Section 15, relating to 'controlling'
persons applies to the employer (brokerage house)-employee relationship." Id. at
1211. Thus, Johns Hopkins appears to be the complete converse of Lun's, both decisions
adopting an exclusivity position but Johns Hopkins holding that it is respondeat
superior which is the exclusive means of imputing liability. In light of the specific
language of the controlling person sections, the interpretation in Johns Hopkins ex-
cluding their application to any employment relationship appears overly restrictive.
43. Nos. 72-1487, -1488, -1489 & -1490 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 1974).
44. Id. at 22.
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rather than exclusive," 11 the court held that a basis for imputing lia-
bility to the employer "need not be sought within the confines of
Section 20 (a)." 46
Support for this view exists in the legislative history surrounding
enactment of the controlling person sections. The primary purpose of
section 15 of the Securities Act was to thwart the use by corporate
directors of "dummies" 4 7 in efforts to avoid personal liability for their
corporate acts.48  Since section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
obviously was patterned after its counterpart in the Securities Act, it
may be inferred that it, too, was aimed at other than the typical employ-
45. Id. n.18.
46. Id. at 22. Instructions to the trial jury had contained references to the defendant's
failure to maintain "a reasonably adequate system of internal supervision and control"
over its employees and its lack of. "reasonable diligence" in enforcing such a system
as possible grounds for finding that the defendant "did not act in good faith within
the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act." The defendant, nevertheless, objected
to the failure of the trial court specifically to refer to the text of section 20(a) or
otherwise to emphasize the defenses available thereunder. The appellate court dismissed
this objection, stating: "[Defendant], in view of the doctrine of respondeat superior,
obtained a more favorable instruction through even general reference to the Section
20(a) defense than it was entitled to, and is in no position to complain." Id.
47. The Senate bill defined "dummy" as "a person who holds legal or nominal
title to any property, but is under a moral or legal obligation to recognize another
as the owner thereof; or a person who has the nominal authority to act in any capacity
but is under a moral or legal obligation to act therein in accordance with the direction
of another." S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(k) (1933).
48. The SEC has made the following excellent analysis of the legislative history of
section 15:
The legislative history of the controlling-persons provisions supports this
analysis of their precise focus. The original Senate version of the 1933
Act contained a number of provisions designed to "aid in preventing direc-
tors from evading the liabilities incident to signing the registration state-
ment I I *." This draft of. the Act dealt with the use of a "dummy"
signer of a registration statement and made the fraudulent use of a "dummy"
unlawful. The House version, which contained registration and anti-fraud
provisions very much like those eventually adopted, contained no sections
expressly dealing either with "dummies" or with controlling persons. In
conference these "'dummy provisions' which were calculated to place
liability upon a person who acted through another, irrespective of whether
a direct agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual control
exercised by one party over the other * * * [were] welded into one and
incorporated as a new section in the substitute." The "new section" is
what is now the controlling-persons provision of Section 15. Thus, that
section was the result of congressional concern with the special problem
presented by the use of "dummies", and was not designed to govern the
usual employment situation.
SEC Brief, supra note 37, at 14.
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er-employee relationship. A statement by Thomas 0. Corcoran, former
presidential advisor and an author of the Securities Exchange Act, sup-
ports this contention: "The purpose [of section 20] is to prevent eva-
sion of the provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will
undertake the actual things forbidden by the section." 4 That this view
was shared by the securities industry at the time is indicated by the
statement of Richard Whitney, then President of the New York Stock
Exchange: "These provisions seem to apply more particularly to cor-
porations and officers, directors and stockholders of corporations than
to exchanges or brokers." 1o
The SEC has consistently taken the position that respondeat superior
is the proper theory for imposing vicarious liability, whenever pos-
sible, for violations of the securities laws,"' and SEC administrative
holdings are to that effect.22 Such precedents, which admittedly are
not controlling on judicial tribunals, were found unpersuasive by the
Lum's court. 3 Nevertheless, the interpretation given a statute by the
agency charged with its administration is entided to considerable
weight2 4 Holdings of the SEC, particularly, "have fared well in the
courts. Their precedent value has often been recognized." I In at
least two cases, Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC-6 and SEC v. Charles
A. Morris & Associates,57 courts have relied heavily upon SEC admin-
istrative decisions in holding employers liable on an agency basis for
employee violations of the securities laws.
Supplemental, rather than exclusive, liability under the controlling
person sections also appears in line with the trend of judicial interpre-
tation of other sections of the securities laws. In light of the remedial
nature of the acts, and the liberal construction to be given them, the
courts have generally expanded, rather than restricted, liabilities there-
49. Hearings on S. Res. 48 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & 57 (73d Cong.) Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6571 (1933).
50. Id. at 6639.
51. Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 958 (1970). See SEC Brief, supra note 37, at 9-15.
52. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); H.P. Schroeder & Co.,
27 S.E.C. 833, 837 (1948); E.H. Rollins & Sons, 18 S.E.C. 347, 379 (1945).
53. 365 F. Supp. at 1062.
54. 2A C. SANVs, SUrTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.05 (4th ed. rev. 1973).
55. 1 A. BRO mERG, SECUiTES LAW: FRAUm § 1.3(1) (1973). See, e.g., Armstrong,
Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Re, 336 F.2d
306, 316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cit. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
56. 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970).
57. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,756 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
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under."' As Professor Ruder has noted, cases involving implied private
rights of action for violations of the Securities Exchange Act are par-
ticularly supportive of retaining respondeat superior as a theory of
vicarious liability, where applicable. The courts have refused in these
implied action cases to apply defenses which would have been available
had the action been brought under a section expressly imposing lia-
bility.9 By analogy, it can be argued that the stricter liability imposed
under the respondeat superior doctrine should not be diluted by the
defenses of the controlling person sections.
CONCLUSION
Although several recent decisions suggest doubts concerning the
proper application of the principle of respondeat superior to securities
law violations, the decision in SEC v. Lum's, Inc. that the controlling
person provisions of the securities acts provide the exclusive means for
imputing vicarious liability for such violations is without firm support,
either in precedent or policy. It is submitted that effectuation of the
language of the controlling person sections, as well as of a primary pur-
pose of the securities laws of investor protection, requires interpretation
of the sections, with their defenses, as supplements to common law
agency principles, to be applied where agency doctrine is unavailable
to impute liability.
58. For example, the scope of the phrase "any person . . . who offers or sells" in
section 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), has been expanded to include
brokers of the seller or buyer, as well as those who actually pass title. See 3 L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 1712-19. Other examples include creation of implied private remedies
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (see 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1763-71) and
under the federal proxy rules (see 2 id. at 932-56).
59. Ruder, supra note 37, at 608 & n.43. For example, an action under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
5 240.10b-5 (1973), is not barred merely because the conduct giving rise to the actiorr
might also be maintained under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
55 77k, 771 (1970), and the rule 10b-5 action is free of the restrictions of those sec-
tions. E.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
